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Multiple sovereignties: Indian tribes,
states, and the federal governtnent
Although often unrecognized, three entities within the territory that constitutes
the United States-Indian tribes, states, and the federal government-have forms
ofsovereignty. The rich and complex relationships among these three sovereignties
need to become integrated into the discussion and law offederalism.
by Judith Resnik
Federal law about Indian tribestends to be considered sepa-rately from the body of lawabout federal-state relations.
But the problems of coordination,
cooperation, deference, and preclu-
sion-central to the law of federal-
ism-are also pivotal when contem-
plating the authority of Indian tribes
and their courts. At issue are the re-
spective arenas of Congress and the
executive branch, as well as the alloca-
tion of power among tribes, states, and
the federal government, the attributes
and prerogatives of sovereigns, and
the deference and comity entailed in
intercourt relationships.
In the context of either state-federal
or tribal-federal law, the task is to work
out relations among sovereigns that
share land and history. Yet equation of
states and tribes would be erroneous,
for profound differences of history,
sociology, and politics exist between
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the two. When viewed in tandem, how-
ever, these bodies of law teach lessons
about the interactions between sover-
eigns and the interd~pendencyof
rules, the tensions that sharing juris-
diction imposes, the pressures toward
nationalization and homogenization,
the wide-spread ambivalence toward
centralization and assimilation, the vi-
tality of both tribal and state courts,
and the impulses toward and the costs
of diversity.!
Tribes and the Constitution
The U.S. Constitution appears to rec-
ognize tribes as having a status outside
its parameters, as entities free from the
taxing powers of states and of the fed-
eral government and with whom the
federal government shares commer-
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1. For elaboration of these issues, see Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States,
and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989),
and Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts":
Revising the Domain ofFederal Courts Jurisprudence at
the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1021 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 (excluding Indians
"not taxed" for purposes of apportioning mem-
bers of House of Representatives among the
states); U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (giving Congress
the power to regulate commerce with the Indian
Tribes); U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, §2 (reiterating
the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" for purposes
of apportionment). For interpretations of other
clauses as referring to tribes, see Charles F.
Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees when Indian
Tribes Act as Majority Societies: The Case of the
Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 773,
774-75 (1988).
cial relations and makes treaties. 2
Some Indian law scholars argue that
the net result is constitutional recogni-
tion of a third domestic sovereign,3
while others describe the relationship
as existing outside the Constitution.4
At issue is whether international law,
rather than internal rules, provides
the appropriate paradigm for evaluat-
ing relations between the United
States and Indian tribes.5
The image of tribes as not a part of
the United States constitutional story
fits the history. Tribes did not partake
in the Constitutional Convention or
3. Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees, supra n. 2,
at 774; see also Charles F. Wilkinson, AMERICAN INDI-
ANS, TIME, AND THE LAw: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN AMODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
4. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, In-
dian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 1 (analyzing
the imposition, without constitutional bases, of
both federal judicial and legislative authority over
tribes).
5. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Chickasaw
Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2217-18 (1995) (invoking
international law when concluding that Oklahoma
could collect income taxes from Indians because
"[t]he Treaty... does not displace the rule, ac-
cepted interstate and internationally, that a sover-
eign may tax the entire income of its residents.");
Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have:
Original Principles ofFederal Indian Law, 64 N.D. L.
REv. 73 (1988). See also Robert A. Williams Jr., The
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of
Decolonizing and A mericanizing the White Man's In-
dian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219; Russell
Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood
Henderson, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL
LIBERTI (1980).
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join in the federation of powers. By the
end of the 19th century, however, Con-
gress was in the business of regulating
the internal affairs of tribes, and the
Supreme Court was upholding such
regulation as properly within the pow-
ers of Congress to protect its "wards."6
Years earlier, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall cast the claim of federal "plenary
power" over Indian tribes in terms of
the right of "discovery,"7 but asJoseph
Story noted, "it seems difficult to per-
ceive, what ground of right any discov-
ery could confer."8
The uncomfortable truth, referred
to in several Supreme Court decisions,
is that federal power derived from con-
quest. As Justice Stanley Reed put it,
"Every American schoolboy knows...
it was not a sale but the conquerors'
will that deprived [Indian tribes] of
their land."9 By virtue of its physical
force, the federal government took
land, removed people from their
homes, attempted to dissuade them
from observing their customs, and im-
posed its rule.
The principle usually relied on to
justify exercise of governmental pow-
ers within the United States is con-
sent of the governed, but it does not
much apply in the Indian tribal con-
text. Unlike states, which ceded
some sovereignty with the passage of
the Constitution,IO Indian tribes did
not. Yet, as William Canby explains,
"the sovereignty of the tribes is sub-
ject to exceptionally great powers of
Congress to regulate and modify the
status of the tribes."l1 Moreover, ac-
6. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
384 (1886) (because Indian communities were
"dependent on the United States," state lackedju-
risdiction to try a tribal member for murder).
7. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543,
573 (1823).
8. Joseph Story, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLASS BOOK:
A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 14-15 (1834).
9. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 289-
90 (1955).
10. The dimensions of which are unclear. See,
e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842 (1995) (two recent decisions in which the
nine justices disagreed about the constitutional al-
location of power between state and federal gov-
ernments).
11. Hon. William C. Canby Jr., The Status of In-
dian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REv.
1,1 (1987). See generally Hon. William C. CanbyJr.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988);
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest:
A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46
ARK. L. REv. 77 (1993); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal
Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
















The U.S. Constitution, the start-
ing point for federal jurispru-
dence, recognizes tribes as having
a status outside its parameters, as
entities with whom the U.S. gov-
ernment conducts commerce
and makes treaties and as entities
freed from the taxing powers of
state or federal governments.
The Constitution explicitly re-
fers to Indians in:
• Article I, Section 8, Clause 3:
[The Congress shall have power
to] regulate commerce with for-
eign nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian
tribes.
• Amendment XIV, Section 2
[reiterating Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3]: Representatives shall
be apportioned among the sev-
eral states ...according to their re-
spective Numbers excluding In-
dians not taxed .
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cording to the Supreme Court,
"Congress has the power to abrogate
Indian treaty rights."12
For judges, lawyers, and scholars
practiced in considering constitu-
tional allocations of powers, the Su-
preme Court's repeated statement of
the enormity of federal "plenary"
power over tribes is both stunning and
dislocating. Consider the holding of a
1985 opinion: "[A]ll aspects oflndian
sovereignty are subject to defeasance
by Congress." 13 When making such a
statement, ordinary constitutional ex-
egesis would oblige the Supreme
Court to refer to a constitutional provi-
sion or to another legal document,
such as a treaty, granting power to the
federal government. 14 Even when con-
stitutional theorists assert that a
branch of the federal government has
unfettered powers (such as prosecuto-
rial discretion), reference is usually
made to other forms of constraint
(such as political recall or dependence
on voter confidence).
A relevant example of expansive
constitutional power and its limits
comes from the jurisdictional field it-
self. Congress is often said to have
"plenary" power over federal courtju-
risdiction,15 but that power is limited-
if not by Article III then by other con-
stitutional provisions, such as the
Fourteenth Amendment. A standard
of law school classes is the proposition
that, however broad reaching Con-
gress's Article III power is, Congress
can surely not use race as a category of
jurisdiction.16 But move to the arena of
the federal relationship with tribes and
even that seemingly easy assumption
requires revision. Both the courts and
Congress have recognized the use of
tribal membership as a basis of federal
court jurisdiction. One might argue
that such decisions rest on a political
rather than a racial identity. But juris-
dictional rules that rely on some
amount of "Indian blood" demon-
strate that, at the time such policies
were crafted, tribes were seen from the
colonizers' perspective as racial group-
ings. Moreover, jurisdictional au-
thority tied to one's political affilia-
tions is also troubling. Yet some
contemporaryjurisdictional rules con-
tinue to rely on whether a litigant is or
is not an "Indian."I?
In short, federal law on Indian tribes
sits uneasily within a context of com-
mitment to legal constraints on gov-
ernmental powers. Given a desire to
trumpet one's national heritage, it is
difficult to grapple with events deeply
embarrassing to those committed to a
vision of the United States as founded
upon consent and dedicated to non-
discriminatory treatment. No comfort-
ing milestones are available. No trans-
formative moments, akin either to the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or to Brown v. Board ojEducation,
make easy the beginning of a revised
narrative. Instead, once federal courts
jurisprudence includes discussion of
federal-tribal relations, the claim that
the U.S. Constitution sets all the limits
of federal power is undermined.
Changing parameters
Congress and the Supreme Court have
shifted policies toward Indian tribes
many times within the last century. In
1887, under the General Allotment
Act,18 Congress authorized the presi-
dent to "allot" land to individual Indi-
ans. The land was to be held in trust
for a period of time and then freed for
conveyance. As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has explained, the legisla-
tion "seem[ed] in part animated by a
desire to force Indians to abandon
their nomadic ways... to 'speed assimi-
lation' ... and ... to free new lands for
further white settlement. "19
By the 1930s, Allotment Act policies
had diminished Indian land holdings
from 138 million to 48 million acres.
Criticism of the policy resulted in con-
12. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309,
2315 (1993) (concluding that, by taking land
within the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation to
build a dam, the United States limited the tribe's
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing
on that land).
13. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851, n.l0 (1985) (quoting
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. LaJolla Bands of
Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 788. n.30 (1984}).
14. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are de-
fined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mis~~ken, or forgotten, the constitution is writ-
ten. ).
15. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
514 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,
449 (1850).
16. See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme
Court-1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congress' Authority to Regulate theJurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17, 26-27
(l981).
17. SeeDurov. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (l990) as re-
vised by Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137,
105 Stat. 646, amending 25 U.S.C. §1301; Oliphant
gressional enactment in 1934 of the
Indian Reorganization Act,20 which
stopped allotment, proclaimed con-
gressional support for Indian self-gov-
ernance, and provided for creation of
tribal constitutions.
A few decades later, federal policy
shifted again. In addition to efforts re-
sulting in "termination" of tribes as
entities recognized by the federal gov-
ernment, in 1968 Congress enacted
the Indian Civil Rights Act,21 which
provided individuals with rights
against tribes akin to the protections
of the Bill of Rights. Many advocates of
tribal sovereignty saw the Indian Civil
Rights Act as intrusive on tribal self-
determination, while others sup-
ported some aspects of the legislation
as appropriately constraining tribal
governments and recognizing distinc-
tive tribal traditions.22
Executive,judicial, and legislative ac-
tion since the late 1960s has altered the
tone once again. In 1968, President
Lyndon Johnson termed the Indian
"the forgotten American," and in
1970, President Richard Nixon's ex-
ecutive order steered federal policies
toward tribal sovereignty by supporting
greater autonomy.23 In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court announced some
rules of deference to tribal courts' civil
jurisdiction,24 permitted only limited
powers in criminal cases,25 and circum-
scribed tribal regulatory activities.26
In 1978, Congress pressed for ad-
ditional tribal court authority by en-
acting the Indian Child Welfare Act,
which provides tribal jurisdiction in
custody proceedings involving In-
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
18. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(1887) (also known as the Dawes Act).
19. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706 (1987).
20.48 Stat. 984 (l934), codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §461 et seq. (also know as the Wheeler-
Howard Act).
21. 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1341 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
22. See Donald L. BurnettJr., An Historical Analy-
sis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 557 (1972).
23. The Forgotten American, Message from the
President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 90-
272,114 CONGo REc. 5394-98 (March 6, 1968); The
American Indians, Message from the President of
the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 , 116
CONGo REc. 23131 Uuly 8, 1970}.
24. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. V. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (l985); Iowa Mutual Ins. CO. V.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)
25. Duro V. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant
V. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
26. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309
(l993); Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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dian children residing or domiciled
within reservations, as well as off the
reservation under certain circum-
stances. 27 In 1993, Congress passed
the Indian Tribal Justice Act to pro-
mote the expansion and effective use
of tribal courts by making federal
funding available for facilities, librar-
ies, and publications. 28 Thus far, no
federal funds have been forthcoming
under this act, but federal, state, and
tribal judges have joined together to
form councils to facilitate inter-
jurisdictional communication.29
While cordiality and respect now
pervade the descriptions, questions of
intersovereign relations remain. 30
Time and again, a tribe or a state makes
a claim of sovereign autonomy, of ex-
emption from national norms, of the
right to have different rules. Time and
again, litigants argue to federal, state,
or tribal judges that their courts lack
authority over them. In each context,
legal actors within tribes, states, and
the federal government are obliged to
think about visions of government,
about when to recognize autonomy of
sovereigns within sovereigns and how
to give meaning to the word "sover-
eignty." When will difference be toler-
ated? Fostered? More fundamentally,
what are the baseline rules or perspec-
tives from which a rule is seen as "dif-
ferent"? When will variation in norms
be trumpeted as evidence of self-con-
stituency and when will it be decried as
oppressive? Of whom? A few examples,
below, demonstrate the complexity of
even the seemingly simple proposition
of respecting sovereignty.
27. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, codified at
25 U.S.C. §1901 etseq. (1988). See Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989)
(rejecting state court jurisdiction and providing
federal common law definition of statutory term
"domicile") .
28. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993),
codified at 25 U.S.C. §360l; §3613 (b) (2)-(7)
(supp. 1995).
29. See J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era ofFederal-
Tribal Court Cooperation, 79 JUDICATURE 150 (1995);
Stanley G. Feldman and David L. Withey, Resolving
state-tribal jurisdictional dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154
(1995). 'Judicial federalism" is on the rise in state-
federal relations as well. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON
LONG RANGE PLANNING--JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 21 (March 1995) (chapter entitled
"Judicial Federalism"); Malcolm M. Lucas, Keynote
Address: National Conference on State-Federal judicial
Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1663 (1992) (at 1992
first national conference of state and federal
judges); William W Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss and
Alan Hirsch, judicial Federalism in Action: Coordina-
FRANK MUTO, LBJ LIBRARY COLLECTION
Interdependencies of norms
In the annals of federal Indian law,
several major recent jurisdictional
markers require attention. A first is
the 1978 case, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez. 31 In 1939, the Santa Clara
Pueblo adopted an ordinance detail-
ing its membership rules. Children
of female members who married out-
side the pueblo would not be "Santa
Clar;;tn," while children of male
members who married outside the
pueblo would be. Two years later,
tion ofLitigation in State & Federal Courts, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1689 (1992).
30. For the concern that national organizations
of tribes have the "potential to erode tribal sover-
eignty," see Nell Jessup Newton, Let a Thousand
Policy-Flowers Bloom: Making Indian Policy in the
Twenty-First Century, 46 ARK. L. REv. 26,34 (1993).
31. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). A rich set of commentar-
ies illuminates this case; see, e.g., Robert Laurence,
A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 307 (1992); Robert A. Will-
iamsJr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding
the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American Indian
Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REv. 1019 (1990); Angela
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
32. The Indian Civil Rights Act states: "No In-
dian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws." 25 U.S.C.
§I302(8) (1982).
33. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57 (footnote
omitted).






Julia Martinez, a member of the
Santa Clara Pueblo, and Myles Mar-
tinez, a Navajo, married, resided on
the Santa Clara Pueblo, and had sev-
eral children.
In the 1970s, after trying unsuccess-
fully to persuade the pueblo to change
its membership rules, Julia Martinez
and her daughter Audrey filed a law-
suit under the Indian Civil Rights Act;
they asked a federal court to invalidate
the ordinance as denying equal pro-
tection and to require the pueblo to
count the Martinez children as mem-
bers.32 Eventually, the Supreme Court
responded. In a decision by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, the Court con-
cluded that the Indian Civil Rights Act
did impose restrictions on tribal gov-
ernments that are "similar, but not
identical, to those contained in the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "33 The Court held, however,
that aside from its provision for habeas
corpus, Congress had not given juris-
diction to federal courts to enforce its
mandates. According to the Court, to
infer federal civil jurisdiction would be
to undermine the congressional pur-
pose of preserving "tribal sovereignty"
and "self-government. "34
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REv. 393 (1991/92).
41. U. S. Dep't of the Interior, Circular No. 3123
(Office oflndian Affairs, Nov. 18, 1935) (interpret-
ing the Indian Reorganization Act to provide ben-
efits for Indians who had "actual tribal affiliation
or... by possessing one-half degree or more of In-
dian blood" and linking approvals of tribal consti-
tutions to rules limiting membership in certain
ways).
42. U. S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau oflndian
Affairs, Tribal Constitutions: A Handbook for BlA
Personnel, at E 6-7 (1987).
43. See Elmer R. Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees
under Tribal Law: A Survey ofCivil Rights Provisions in
Tribal Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 269, 290
(1989) (of 220 tribal constitutions reviewed, no
uniform pattern on civil liberties emerged).
44. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp.
5,14 (D.N.M. 1975).
45. See 25 U.S.C. §476(a) (1988 & Supp. 1995).
46. 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Dep't of
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs at 447 (Powers
oflndian Tribes) (Oct. 25, 1934); 25 C.F.R. §83.7
(1995), and the discussion in Robert N. Clinton,
Nell Jessup Newton and Monroe E. Price, AMERICAN
INDIAN LAw 78-93 (3d ed. 1991).
should not be seen as a completely au-
tonomous action. Federal policies
urged written constitutions and pro-
moted restrictive membership defini-
tions. The idea of membership itself
was central to federal law that linked
the provision of federal benefits to
membership status. According to the
trial court opinion in Santa Clara
Pueblo, the "most important of the ma-
terial benefits" sought by the family
were "land use rights. "44 Without the
membership status conferred by the
pueblo, the Martinez children could
not receive federal health benefits or
federal assistance in build-
ing homes on pueblo land.
Thus, for advocates of
tribal autonomy, Santa
Clara Pueblo is less a victory
than it might seem. While a
federal court had not man-
dated membership rules,
federal policies created the
incentives that framed the
litigation; executive branch
officials were part of the
very process of developing
membership rules. Fur-
ther, federal law requires
Interior Department ap-
proval of tribal constitu-
tions,45 and federal rules determine
'what constitutes a "tribe" as a matter of
federal law.46
Santa Clara Pueblo also does not
stand as an example of federal tolera-
tion of tribal norms deeply divergent
from those of the United States. Link-
rules nor to claim homogeneity
among tribes. The more than 400 fed-
erally recognized tribes, as well as the
many other tribes, have a range of
membership and of other rules. 43 The
point, rather, is to make plain that
Santa Clara Pueblo's rule making
35. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp.
5,15 (D.N.M. 1975).
36. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S at 72. n.32.
37. Constitution and Bylaws of the Pueblo of
Santa Clara, New Mexico (approved Dec. 20, 1935)
in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, No. 76-682 (1976).
While the document is obviously influenced by the
U.S. Constitution, that constitution in turn may
have been influenced by the government of the
Iroquois Confederacy. See Arthur C. Parker, The
Constitution of the Five Nations, or the Iroquois Book of
the Great Law, 184 N.Y. STATE MUSEUM BULL. (1916).
38. Constitution and Bylaws of the Pueblo of
Santa Clara, in Appendix, supra n. 37, at 2. Liti-
gated at trial, with opposing anthropological inter-
pretations. were the history and practice of Santa
Claran membership. See Resnik, Dependent Sover-
eigns, supra n. I, at 705-12.
39. Ordinance of 1939, in Appendix, supra n. 37,
at 18.
40. Barsh & Henderson, supra n. 5, at 117-22.
More recently, some tribes have amended these
documents, and their courts are developing juris-
prudential interpretations. See Frank Pommer-
sheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZAGA L.
adopted without much alteration. 40
Further, in the 1930s, the Depart-
ment of the Interior recommended
that tribal membership rules be re-
strictive. 41 More recent editions of
the BIA instruction manual suggest
that membership rules be explained
in tribal constitutions. When such
rules make significant changes in the
size of a tribe, the BIAs's central of-
fice, rather than its branches, must
approve the alterations.42
The point here is neither to debate
the authority of a sovereign-here, the
Santa Clara Pueblo-to change its
Under Santa Clara Pueblo,
tribal courts enforce
most mandates of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.
At one level, Santa Clara Pueblo is an
"easy" case, identifiably a triumph for
tribal self-governance. As the district
judge had put it, "In deciding who is
and who is not a member, the Pueblo
decides what it is that makes its mem-
bers unique, what distinguishes a
Santa Clara Indian from everyone else
in the United States. "35 Similarly, Jus-
tice Marshall spoke of the "often vast
gulf between tribal traditions and
those with which federal courts are
more intimately familiar. "36
But the line between the United
States and the Santa Clara Pueblo is
not so easily drawn. The
construction of the 1939
membership rules is not
only an artifact of the
pueblo as a political en-
tity constituting itself.
When in 1934 the Indian
Reorganization Act was
passed, the Santa Clara
Pueblo (like many other
tribes) organized under
its provisions. In 1935, as
required by this act, the
secretary of the interior
approved a newly written
Santa Clara Pueblo Con-
stitution that begins:
"We, the people of the Santa Clara
Pueblo, in order to establish justice,
promote the common welfare and
preserve the advantages of self-gov-
ernment, do ordain and establish
this Constitution. "37 Under that
document, Santa Clara members
could include "children of mixed
marriages between members 'of the
Santa Clara pueblo and nonmem-
bers" if the tribal council so decided,
as well as "persons naturalized as
members of the pueblo. "38
In 1939, however, the secretary of
the interior approved an amend-
ment changing membership rules by
limiting them to children either of
two Santa Claran parents or "born of
marriages between male mem-
bers ... and non-members. "39 The
sources of the change in member-
ship rules are not available from the
case records. What is known is that
the Bureau of Indian Affairs was
much involved in creating tribal con-
stitutions; its models and "boil-
erplate provisions" were often
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In 1954 Vice-President
Richard Nixon received a
peace pipe from a
delegation of Indians.
In 1970, as president, he
signed an executive order
supporting greater
autonomy for Indian tribes.
ing rights of children to their fathers
was a feature of the common law,47 as
was differential treatment of women
and men. In short, the membership
rule at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo needs
be understood as akin to a joint ven-
ture, crafted under pressure from the
federal government and not at odds
with federal traditions.
Measures of sovereignty
Advocates of Santa Clara Pueblo as a
guidepost to tribal sovereignty can
fairly argue that, by limiting the role of
federal courts when members of tribes
object to their tribes' practices, its
holding has far-reaching implications.
Under its holding, tribal courts rather
than federal courts enforce most of
the mandates of the Indian Civil
47.25 V.S.c. §184 (1988) provides that when an
"Indian woman" and a "white man" married
prior to the enactment of the statute in 1897, their
children would continue to have rights via their
mothers to Indian tribal properties. That provision
altered the common law practice, under which the
"condition of the father prevails, in determining
the status of the offspring.... " Letter of George H.
Shields, assistant attorney general (Nov. 27, 1891),
in S. Exec. Doc. No. 59, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., In re
Sioux Mixed Blood at 6.
48.436 V.S. at 72 (footnote omitted).
49.435 V.S. 191 (1978).
50. Id. at 208-210.
51. Id. at 211-212.
Rights Act.
But how much to celebrate the deci-
sion depends on how one defines sov-
ereignty and on what incidents of sov-
ereignty one values. While the Court in
Santa Clara Pueblo concluded that a nar-
row interpretation of the Indian Civil
Rights Act was required to avoid what it
viewed to be federal interference with
a "tribe's ability to maintain itself as a
culturally and politically distinct en-
tity,"48 just two months before, in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,49 the
Court held that Indian tribes lacked
authority to punish non-Indians who
commit crimes on tribal reservations.
Oliphant arose when two non-Indian
residents of the Suquamish reserva-
tion sought and won habeas corpus re-
lief from convictions in the tribal
52. One analogy in federalism doctrine is the
"domestic relations exception" to diversity juris-
diction, in which federal courts decline to exercise
the jurisdiction they have when litigants bring di-
vorce, child custody, and support cases to them. See
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992),
criticized in Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism
and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REv. 1073 (1994);
see also Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.V.
L. REv. 1662, 1739-1750 (1991).
53.495 V.S. 676 (1990).
54. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137,
amending 25 V.S.c. §1301 (2) (3) (4).
courts. According to the majority opin-
ion by then-Associate Justice William
Rehnquist, to permit tribal courts to
try non-Indians would be "inconsis-
tent" with the status of Indian tribes.
Tribal powers were limited not only by
treaty but by some ill-defined prohibi-
tion that they not "conflict with [the]
overriding sovereignty" of the United
States.50 According to the majority,
while "some Indian tribal court sys-
tems have become increasingly sophis-
ticated and resemble in many respects
their state counterparts," tribal justice
would not always comport with the due
process requirements of federal law.51
Oliphant contrasts sharply with Santa
Clara Pueblo. Tribes are permitted to
decide some "internal" matters,52 but
the central problem of maintaining
order on land (frequently populated,
in part by virtue of federal Allotment
Act policies, by members of many
tribes and by individuals unaffiliated
with tribes) is beyond their ken. The
Court went further in Duro v. Reina,53
holding that tribal courts also lacked
authority over non-tribal members,
but that rule has been reversed by
Congress. 54 Currently, tribal courts
have jurisdiction over those criminal
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defendants who are "Indians" and
who have committed certain crimes
within triballands.55
On the civil side, in the wake of
Santa Clara Pueblo, the Supreme Court
held in National Farmers Union Insur-
ance Companies v. Crow Tribe"6 and in
Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v.
LaPlante'" that federal courts should
not exercise civil jurisdiction over ac-
tivities arising on tribal lands, at least
not if cases are pending in
tribal courts and tribal
remedies have been ex-
hausted, and possibly not
thereafter.58 Here the doc-
trines echo law generated
in the context of state-fed-
eral relations. A basic
proposition is that while
federal courts do not lack
jurisdiction, rules of co-
mity and abstention man-
date deference to another
court's decision.
But reflective of the dif-
fering histories of states
and tribes, the fit is far
from exact. On the civil side, Supreme
Court opinions arguably demonstrate
greater federal deference to tribal
courts than to state courts. If a tribe is
found to have jurisdiction, then its
holdings on the merits, even when im-
plicating federal law, cannot be re-
viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.59
But in some contexts, federal courts
accord less deference to decisions of
tribal courts than to those of state
courts. Unlike the full faith and credit
accorded to state court decisions
about their own jurisdiction, federal
courts have retained power to decide
the question of tribal jurisdiction
anew.60
Moreover, the deference accorded
states on the criminal side, exemplified
by Younger v. Hams61 and by a growing
body of federal habeas law insulating
state decision making, is not paralleled
in the tribal context. While state crimi-
nallaws can be applied to non-citizens
within state borders (but not always to
Indian tribe members), under Oli-
phant, tribes cannot enforce their
criminal laws against non-Indians but
must instead depend on another sov-
ereign's law-enforcement interests,c,2
In addition, while the Supreme
Court has imposed exacting standards
when Congress has attempted to limit
state sovereign immunity,63 the Court
has a more relaxed standard for inter-
preting statutes involving limits on
tribal powers. Even with the rule that
because of the "dependent" status of
tribes, statutes are to be construed in
their favor, the Court's statutory in-
quiries rely on a wider range of materi-
als and principles than when states'
The deference accorded
states on the criminal
side is not paralleled
in the tribal context.
sovereign powers are at stake.64
It is not only limits on jurisdiction
that demonstrate ongoing federal con-
trol. Tribal courts themselves have a
history of federal oversight. A first
55. See generally Frank Pommersheim, The Cru-
cibles oJSovereignty: Analyzing Issues oJ TribalJurisdic-
tion, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1989).
56.471 U.S. 845 (1985).
57.480 U.S. 9 (1987).
58. See Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912
(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (describing the discre-
tion of the federal court and finding abstention
proper there); Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg.
Corp.• 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 621 (1993) (requiring examination of "fac-
tual circumstances of each case ... in order to deter-
mine whether the issue in dispute is truly a reserva-
tion affair entitled to the exhaustion doctrine").
59. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S.
at 20-22 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66 n.21 Uudg-
ments of tribal courts may be due full faith and
credit in certain situations "properly within their
jurisdiction"); In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 68 (4th
Cir. 1989) (noting authority supporting the propo-
sition that tribes constitute "territories" due full
faith and credit under the Parental Kidnaping Pre-
vention Act); Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d
1030 (Ariz. 1991) (honoring Nav~jo court certifi-
cates compelling attendance of witness at trial un-
der the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Pro-
ceedings).
60. As the Ninth Circuit put it, "[T]he question
of tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question."
FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311.
1314 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943
(1991) (establishing de novo review for "federal le-
gal questions" and a more deferential "clearly er-
r.one~,us standard of review for factual ques-
tIOns. ).
mechanism that infuses federal norms
over Indian dispute resolution pro-
cesses is divesting tribes ofjurisdiction
or supervising their exercise of it. A
second method of control has been to
instruct and influence tribes about
how to exercise the jurisdiction that re-
mains theirs. In 1884, the secretary of
the interior established "courts of In-
dian offenses," staffed by Indian
judges charged with bringing federal
legal norms to the tribes.65
Mter the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934, many
tribes adopted courts oper-
ating under federal regula-
tions, hence known as
"CFR" courts. 66 Some
commentators view the
1968 Indian Civil Righ ts
Act as continuing the pres-
sures on tribes to rely on
federal legal traditions.
Moreover, in opinions like
Oliphant, federal judges in-
dicate that their measure
of tribal court quality is
based on United States
standards,6' prompting concern
among Indian law scholars that federal
deference may depend on imitation of
federal practices. fiB
Of course, just as the Santa Clara
61. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
62. See Wallace, supra n. 29, at 153 (discussing
designation by federal authorities in Arizona and
Oregon of tribal prosecutors as special assistant
U.S. attorneys to fill in 'Jurisdictional gaps" and
appointing federal magistrate judges to hold court
sessions on tribal reservations). Given the differing
traditions of punishment, tribal courts may be able
to exercise civil jurisdiction to accomplish that for
which the federal and state system use criminal
provisions.
63. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985). The Court has also concluded
that absent consent, states are immune from suit by
tribes. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501
U.S. 775 (1991).
64. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 965-66
(1994); South Dakota v. Bourland. 113 S. Ct. at
2316-20.
65. See Robert N. Clinton, Development oJ Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspec-
tive, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951 (1975).
66. See INmAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE OF
TRIBAL COURTS, A SURVEY OF TRIBAL COURTS CON-
DUCTED BY HIE AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PRO-
GRAM (1977); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation,
Dreams and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal CourtJuris-
prudence, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 411 (1992).
67. "[S]ome Indian tribal courts have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many
respects their state counterparts." Oliphant, 435
U.S. at 211-12. .
68. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Le-
gitimacy ojAdjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role oj
the TribalIJar as an Intelflretive Community: An E,say,
18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 70 (1988).
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Pueblo's membership rule is influ-
enced by federal law but is not simply
federal, so tribal courts are formed by
more than federal regulation. Many
Indian tribal courts have aspects not
familiar to those schooled in federal
court practices. While contemporary
discussions celebrate some of these
forms of justice, such as the Navajo
peacemaker,69 both non-Indian law-
yers and federal judges occasionally
rebel at the modes of decision making
in tribal courts. 70 Bills have been intro-
duced into Congress to limit the reach
of Santa Clara Pueblo-to provide that,
upon exhaustion of tribal court rem-
edies and a showing of a failure of the
tribal court to be "fully independent"
from legislative or executive authority
or of a failure to provide certain forms
of process, an individual could obtain
new decision making from a federal
court. 71 The language of such propos-
als is akin to the federal habeas stat-
ute,72 and the issues-when should
federal norms trump state decision-
making processes and outcomes, and
when should federal courts defer-are
parallel.
The challenges unending
Again and again, in the context of the
relationship between federal courts
and either state or tribal courts, one
can watch the interplay among mul-
tiple, overlapping court systems, be-
tween expansion and contraction of
jurisdiction, sometimes to affirm diver-
sity and sometimes to encourage as-
similation by the application of nation-
wide norms. 73 In both contexts, the
enormity of federal power is dis-
played-even by the words used when
describing the area of law. What might
have been called "the law of federal-
state relations" is instead termed "fed-
69. Feldman & Withey, supra n. 29, at 155. See
also Symposium, Conflict Resolution in NativeJustice
Traditions, 27 NIDR FORUM I (1995).
70. See, e.g., Little Horn State Bank v. Crow
Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D. Mont.
1988) (describing the tribal court as a "sort of
'kangaroo court' [that) has made no pretense of
due process or judicial integrity"), vacated pursu-
ant to the parties' stipulation, 708 F. Supp. 1561
(D. Mont. 1989).
71. S. 517. JOIst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Indian
Civil Rights Act Amendments granting federal ju-
risdiction over civil rights actions alleging failures
to comply with the act's provisions).
72.28 U.S.c. §2254 (1988).
73. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Ideolo-
gies ofFederal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1150
(1988).
eral courts jurisprudence." Similarly,
the vantage point on tribal law comes
not from the many tribes but by virtue
of "federal tribal law." In both in-
stances, at issue is how "plenary" the
power of Congress is and will be and
when the Supreme Court will step in
and declare Congress limited-in the
state arena by the Constitution and
in the tribal arena by some undefined
but occasionally enforced cap on fed-
eral authority.
From one vantage point, the
"other" courts, be they state or tribal,
exist only at the grace of the federal
courts' willingness to defer. The power
of these courts rely on the interpreta-
tive gestures of Erie v. Tompkins74 and
Murdock v. Memphis75 (in the context of
the states) and on Santa Clara Pueblo
and LaPlante (in the context of the
tribes). Under this view, many of this
century's jurisdictional developments
reflect state and tribal courts (as well
as the increasingly powerful private
court system) as derivative of the na-
tional system. All rely on the federal
courts for power and all are given
power when federal courts themselves
feel overwhelmed by the press of cases
and are therefore eager to support
other venues of decision making.76
But docket pressures are not the
only factor animating jurisdictional
authority. Just as federal policies about
tribes have shifted, sometimes empha-
sizing assimilation and sometimes cel-
ebrating difference, parallel swings
mark the relationship between state
and national courts. When racial
equality came to be seen as a national
norm, toleration of any state's claim of
difference waned. When racial oppres-
sion was tied to the operations of state
criminal justice systems, federal atten-
tion was turned to state conviction pro-
74.304 U.S. 64 (1938) (under diversity jurisdic-
tion, federal courts have no authority to develop
common law rules but must apply state law).
75.87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (independent
state grounds insulate the highest rulings of state
courts from Supreme Court review).
76. See, e.g., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS, supra n. 29, at 13 (arguing for a
need to control the growth of the federal courts
because of a perceived "crisis" and then recom-
mending to Congress that cases be shifted to Ar-
ticle I courts or administrative agencies and that
most matters be resolved in state courts).
77. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965).
78. See Aviam Soifer, LAw AND THE COMPANY WE
KEEP (1995) (analyzing the role ofgroups and com-
munities in constituting the United States).
cesses.77 And when federal interest in
both racial equality and its impact on
the administration of criminal justice
either wanes or exhausts itself, the
themes of state sovereignty reemerge.
Thus, the most difficult issues for fed-
eral courts jurisprudence are to ex-
plain how to engender differences,
when the federal government's right
to assert a baseline exists, and what the
federal norm should be.
An alternative conception of this
century's history of intergovernmen-
tal relations does not trumpet federal
power but rather remarks on the vital-
ity and vibrancy of these "other"
courts that have survived despite sus-
tained assimilation pressures. Under
this view, their power stems not so
much from the vagaries of federallar-
gesse as from the persuasive and com-
pelling claims of tribes and states,
claims of connection to peoples and
law not federally generated. From this
perspective, the federal courts are
themselves "dependent sovereigns,"
dependent on the multiple court sys-
tems within the United States for the
legitimacy of the rule of law.78
As one watches the pendulum
swing, one point remains constant.
Given the interconnections of land,
history, and cultures, neither federal,
state, nor tribal courts are entities unto
themselves. All are products of these
exchanges, the promises made and
broken, the interactions and inter-
weavings among sovereigns that blur
the sources of difference. Considering
the relationships among tribes, states,
and the national government can thus
serve as a reminder of the importance
of claims of difference and of the need
to explore distinctions among sover-
eign authorities. Learning about the
interaction between states, the federal
government, and Indian tribes is more
than an act of inclusion or a self-con-
scious exercise in penance. To con-
sider the history and contemporary
concerns about these court systems is
to learn about forms of group identity
and governance that survive in the
midst of domination, and that survival
of such identity and governance is a
product of the decisions and interac-
tions of the many sovereignties that
are within the United States. ~!~
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